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This research examines the multi-vectored nature of Belarusian foreign policy 
since 1996 when Alexander Lukashenka solidified his regime in Belarus until today. The 
trends in Belarusian foreign policy are analyzed through the scope of interdependency 
and its intricate interplay with Belarusian national identity, or in other words, how 
President Lukashenka understands and interprets the Belarusian people. Since the early 
2000s, it appeared that Belarus changed its foreign policy in an attempt to become less 
dependent on Russia and more open to working with new partners. Officially, 
Lukashenka has consistently maintained a multi-vector approach to Belarusian foreign 
policy and also in practice, despite intermittent speculation that Belarus might drastically 
change the dynamics of its foreign policy. Decreasing dependence is not motivation 
enough to completely alter perceived stability and a reluctance for change among the 
Belarusian people. Lukashenka uses the flexibility of his foreign policy to try to extract 
some benefits from global partners; however, the status quo of Lukashenka’s foreign 
policies continues to remain intact.  
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Abstrakt 
 Tento výzkum se zabývá multi-vectored charakter běloruského zahraniční 
politiky od roku 1996, kdy Alexandr Lukašenko zpevnil jeho režim v Bělorusku až do 
dneška. Trendy v běloruském zahraniční politiky jsou analyzovány pomocí rozsah 
vzájemné provázanosti a jeho složitou souhru s běloruskou národní identity, nebo 
jinými slovy, jak prezident Lukašenko rozumí a interpretuje běloruskému lidu. Od 
počátku roku 2000 se ukázalo, že Bělorusko změnila svou zahraniční politiku ve snaze 
stát se méně závislé na Rusku a více otevřeni spolupráci s novými partnery. Oficiálně 
Lukašenko neustále udržoval multi-vector přístup k běloruské zahraniční politice a také 
v praxi, a to navzdory občasné spekulacím, že Bělorusko by mohlo drasticky změnit 
dynamiku své zahraniční politiky. Snižující závislost není dostatečnou motivací, aby 
úplně změnit vnímanou stabilitu a neochotu ke změně mezi běloruského lidu. 
Lukašenko využívá flexibilitu jeho zahraniční politiky pokusit se extrahovat některé 
výhody plynoucí z globálních partnerů; Nicméně, status quo Lukašenkem své 
zahraniční politiky nadále zůstávají nedotčeny. 
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At the onset of my research, I initially wanted to avoid any attempt in answering 
the national identity or Lukashenka questions regarding Belarus. My goal was to 
analyze Belarus in a way that does not have to address what it means to be Belarusian 
and how that can be realized in Lukashenka’s regime. I quickly realized that Belarus 
cannot be understood without understanding Lukashenka’s regime and how it could 
potentially be a reflection of Belarusian national identity. The assumption among many 
people who are not from Belarus, and among some people there, is that the Belarusian 
people do not have a voice and their opinions are not reflected in President 
Lukashenka’s regime. Instead, this research assumes that Belarusian identity and the 
wants of the people is in fact reflected in Lukashenka’s regime and he bases his policies 
on his understanding of what the Belarusian people want, what it means to be 
Belarusian, and what is best for the Belarusian nation and the Belarusian state. 
Belarusian national identity is not as easily understood as other national identities and 
arguably the entire country is an enigma. Instead of tackling the difficult question of 
Belarusian national identity or the regime of Lukashenka, my research focuses on 
Lukashenka’s foreign policy in recent years. His foreign policy appeared to be 
transforming lately and the relationship between Belarus and Russia appeared to be 
weakening. This research seeks to answer the question of what transformations have 
taken place in Belarusian foreign policy and why.  
Multi-vectored foreign policy, also known as multi-polared, is an approach that 
emphasizes a policy focused on more than one exclusive partner. President Lukashenka 
officially adopted this foreign policy in the 1990s. The reasoning behind his adoption of 
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this policy often changes and depends on the current international climate. Did Belarus 
adapt its foreign policy in response to external factors, for example Russia adopting a 
different foreign policy than it had in the 1990s? Is President Lukashenka more willing 
to work with other partners because he wants Belarus to become a more open and active 
participant in an ever globalizing world? The foreign policy of Belarus has officially not 
changed since 1996, the year Lukashenka solidified his regime, and has not changed in 
practice either if one looks at the trend over the past 20 years in Belarus foreign 
relations. At given specific times, sometimes Belarus seems to apply its official policy 
more in practice, but the trend is towards keeping relationships with foreign partners at 
the status quo. By analyzing Lukashenka’s regime and the role of interdependence in 
Belarusian foreign policy, I hope to uncover the motives behind the multi-vector foreign 
policy of Lukashenka and reveal that Lukashenka’s foreign policy officially and 
practically has not changed, despite recent postulation that it may have. 
2. Methodology 
 The main sources of information in this paper draw from President of Belarus 
Alexander Lukashenka himself, opinions of Belarusian elites, and the official foreign 
policies of Belarus and its respective international partners. The methodology used in this 
paper relies heavily on the opinions of Belarusian elites compiled by the Stefan Batory 
Foundation in 2006. This foundation is based in Poland and members of this organization 
interviewed numerous Belarusian elites in 2006 following the Belarusian presidential 
election. I use these sources combined with Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s work 
on interdependence to frame how dependence and interdependence and the Belarusian 
national identity interplay to form Belarusian foreign policy. This research and analysis 
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contributes to academia through analysis of recent developments and stagnations in 
Belarusian foreign policy by evaluating trends primarily since the 2006 election. My 
research acts as a qualitative analysis of Belarusian foreign policy today and how it has 
transformed in the past 20 years since Lukashenka solidified his power in Belarus.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
 The theoretical framework of my research relies heavily upon the interrelated 
theories of dependence, dependency, and interdependence. These three concepts help 
unveil how Lukashenka deals with the question of dependency in Belarus through foreign 
policy.   
3.1. State of Art 
3.1.1. Interdependence 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye wrote extensively about interdependence 
in their ground-breaking work Power and Interdependence. Written in 1989, they apply 
their theory primarily on the United States and it’s the USA’s relationship with other 
countries. Keohane and Nye begin by defining dependence because in order to understand 
interdependence it is necessary to understand dependence. According to Keohane and 
Nye dependence means “a state of being determined or significantly affected by external 
forces”.1 They then define interdependence as “mutual dependence”. This means that 
countries are connected with each other and vulnerable to any changes outside the 
country. Most countries have something to offer another country and coexist in a 
globalized community that cannot become less connected. Dependence also is contingent 
                                                          
1 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (USA: Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1989), 8 
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upon what the country depends on from another foreign actor. Some goods are more 
important for national security than others. For instance, oil is more crucial to security 
than luxury goods.2  
Every country today in this globalized world uses some type of independence. 
Dependence is not a desirable position and interdependence acts as a way to break out of 
dependence. Nevertheless, interdependence should not be seen as solely positive and a 
combatant against dependence. Keohane and Nye expliciately state that “interdependence 
will always involve costs because interdependence restricts autonomy”.3 Interdependency 
may restrict automony, but dependence would outright prevent autonomy so 
interdependency is a still a preferable option for autonomy than dependence and a 
favorable position for the less powerful country to be in. 
Under the theory of interdependence, domestic policy and foreign policy have a 
mutually beneficial relationship.4 Interdependence not only contributes to increased 
relations with foreign actors, but in turn leads to a more stable environment domestically. 
Keohane and Nye stress that interdependence does not ultimately decrease any problems 
within the international realm. Interdependence is not a zero-sum game. Power can 
increase simultaneously in each country, if the status-quo remains the same. 
Interdependence means mutual dependence; yet, interdependence does not lead to or even 
mean that each actor will mutually benefit each other equally.5 In the majority of cases, 
                                                          
2 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (USA: Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1989), 9 
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (USA: Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1989), 9 
4 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (USA: Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1989), 8 
5 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (USA: Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1989), 10 
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one country is rarely or never fully dependent on another country. There is a spectrum of 
dependence and interdependence, with essentially everyone having some degree of 
interdependence. Each country offers at least something to the other. Usually there is an 
unequal level of interdependence where one country is more dependent on the other and 
vice versa.6   
Interdependence is not an alternative to dependence but instead a variation of 
dependence. Interdependence is not a way for a dependent to break out of dependence 
entirely but acts as a way for both partners to depend on each other in some way. The 
degree of dependence depends on the partner within the relationship. Within the context 
of globalization, most countries are offering at least something to their partners and 
alliances, either through trade or through ideological partnerships.  
3.1.2. Further Research  
  Thomas Angotti, a dependency theorist, describes dependence within the context 
of Latin America. Due to economic differences, Latin American countries have had to 
rely on other countries with different economic systems more suitable to the current 
economic and international environment at present.  Angotti defines dependency as a 
phenomenon where a dependent is contingent upon on a dominant country. The dominant 
country sees the dependent country as underdeveloped and itself as developed. The 
dominant country furthers this idea of underdevelopment by propagating an image of 
backwardness in the dependent country in order to suit their own needs, i.e. exploitation 
of labor and capital. The dominant country views this exploitation as necessary and 
“requires repression of independent nations in order to guarantee the export of capital.” 
Angotti believes that independence from foreign dominion is the cure for 
                                                          
6 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (USA: Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1989), 11 
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underdevelopment and that underdevelopment is caused by external forces (the dominant 
country). Dependency theory accentuates the rejection of backwardness, analyses the 
belief that developed counties make up the “core” and are surrounded by a less-advanced 
dependent periphery, and that capital and labor in the dependent countries does not equal 
to the value produced for the dominant country.7 Scholar Tony Smith does not deny the 
importance of foreign influence in weaker states; however, he views the economic effect 
on the development in these relatively weaker states from the stronger ones as 
exaggerated. He essentially dismisses dependency theory as an “attempt at Marxism” and 
things that local circumstances factor more into the development of the “dependent” 
countries than imperialist or capitalism forces from the dominant countries.8  
Dependency is prevalent in Latin American countries that have to deal with the 
hegemon of the United States as their big neighbor to the north. Belarus and other post-
Soviet states must deal with dependency in their own way with Russia acting as their 
hegemon in the region. Despite a relatively higher degree of dependence of post-Soviet 
states on Russia, Belarus included, interdependency used as a means to break away from 
dependence does not exist in the post-Soviet space as much as it would seem. The 
countries in this space today seek their own personal goals in foreign relations. Trade 
unions and the Single Economic Space made it possible to lower tariffs and encourage 
trade within the region; however, fear of Russian hegemony created a situation where 
other countries seek economic interdependence through other means other than working 
                                                          
7 Thomas Angotti, “The Political Implications of Dependency Theory,” Latin American 
Perspectives 8, no. 3 (1981): 125-135 
8 Tony Smith, “The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited,” International 
Organization 35, no. 4 (1981): 761 
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solely with Russia.9 Yet, the benefits of economic dependence keep many countries 
happily reliant on Russia in exchange for political allegiance. The incentive to break out 
of dependence deceases when the benefits of staying in a relationship where the 
dependence is mutual, although not equal, remain greater than the costs. In summation, 
interdependence does not act as a tool to decrease dependence but instead is another form 
of dependence. My research explores Belarusian dependence and its reconciliation with 
how Belarusians see themselves at home and in relation to the rest of the world.    
2. Literature Review 
The current state of art surrounding multi-vectorism in Belarusian foreign policy 
is not vast. Belarus continues to be a mystery to most foreign and domestic scholars. 
Scholar Grigory Ioffe has written the most extensively about Belarus in many aspects 
such as language, political atmosphere, and foreign policy. Ioffe writes about how the 
west does not understand Belarus regarding its foreign policy and further, does not 
understand Belarus in general.10 Other scholars write about Lukashenka’s regime and the 
national identity in Belarus and how this translates into the foreign policy of Belarus.  
National identity and Lukashenka’s regime are at the forefront of inquisition in Belarus. 
Does Belarusian national identity even exist and how can the Belarusian people escape 
Lukashenka’s alleged oppressive rule? My research does not seek to answer these 
questions but instead operates under the assumption that Belarusians have a distinct 
identity and is a manifestation of what the Belarusian people support. Instead of seeking 
                                                          
9 Alexander Libman, “Regionalization and Regionalism in the Post-Soviet Space: 
Current Status and Implications for Institutional Development,” Europe-Asia Studies 
59, no. 3 (2007): 401-430 
10 Grigory Ioffe, Understanding Belarus and How Western Foreign Policy Misses the 
Mark (USA, 2008) 
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to resolve these questions about national identity and the Lukashenka regime, this 
research examines how Lukashenka uses the national character of the Belarusian people 
and their support to shape his policies.  Priority attention to Lukashenka’s regime is 
crucial since Belarus cannot be understood separate of understanding President 
Lukashenka and his regime. The Belarusian national identity as understood by 
Lukashenka contributes to shaping his foreign policy. Dependence and interdependence 
in Belarusian foreign policy is shaped by the national character of the Belarusian people.  
2.1. Lukashenka’s National Identity in Belarus  
 Various aspects of national identity in Belarus exist, albeit not a distinct language, 
religion, or history. The modern Belarusian state under the Lukashenka regime 
emphasizes certain aspects that contribute to Lukashenka’s policy-making. These 
characteristics exist as part of Lukashenka’s regime, but also it can be assumed that these 
characteristics are a reflection of how the Belarusian people see themselves and wish to 
be seen by others. These key characteristics are as follows: Soviet-nostalgia, “Little-
Russianism”. 
2.1.1. Soviet-nostalgia  
When Lukashenko became President in 1994, he almost immediately he 
abandoned the ideologies supporting Belarusian nationalism/nostalgia for the ancient 
Belarusian nation instead opting for policies in favor of nostalgia for the Belarus Socialist 
Republic. He reversed most privatization by re-nationalizing many large businesses that 
had been privatized and discarded national symbols in favor of reinstating Soviet 
symbols, for example restoring the socialist flag.11 
                                                          
11 Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political 
Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 3 (2000): 526 
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2.1.2. “Little Russianism” 
History emphasized how Belarusians were the purest of the East Slavs, 
maintaining their purity by avoiding occupation by either Turkish or Mongol forces, 
unlike the Ukrainians and Russians. Belarusian patriotism abandons the Grand Duchy 
past in favor of emphasizing the Soviet past. The official policy stresses Pan-Slavism and 
“Little Russianism”. One of the policies of Lukashenka almost instantly was reinstating 
textbooks that emphasized these two ideologies. Despite these connections with other 
Slavs, in 1922 the creation of the Belarusian Soviet Republic did not fuse Belarusians 
with Russians. However, the state was created before the nation and consequently, 
Belarus has always had a weak sense of national identity, only made weaker by the 1990s 
policies wishing for the “return to Eurasia”.12 
Scholars Eke and Kuzio argue that the only pro-Russian force in Belarus is 
Lukashenka and Lukashenka is only popular among the people due to “mass political 
apathy, poverty, and lack of information”. 13 Lukashenka support base largely comes from 
pensioners and the rural population, where the Belarusian government spends more than 
double on farm subsidies than even its giant neighbor, Russia, to the east. The support for 
Lukashenka varies throughout the country. There is an east-west divide and additionally 
a language divide, where in the west there is more support for the Belarusian independent 
nation and in the west there is more support for connections with Russia and the Soviet 
past. The issue of language in Belarus is a key element in its nation-building process 
where all attempts at making the Belarusian language the preferred language in Belarus 
were halted immediately by Lukashenka in favor of the Russian language. Now many 
                                                          
12 Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political 
Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 3 (2000): 528 
13 Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political 
Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 3 (2000): 532 
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Belarusians speak some hybrid form of Belarusian mixed with Russian, diffusing the 
divisions between Russian and Belarusian identities.  
Eke and Kuzio describe the basis of Lukashenka’s policies is an “irrational mix of 
policies, implemented in a random manner”. 14 The Soviet ideology and the emphasis on 
“little Russianism” do not coexist easily with Belarusian patriotism. A telling description 
of Lukashenka’s policy in Belarus is that it is a “tango of convenience”, where 
Lukashenka has no clear ruling ideology and is able to keep his interests relatively fluid 
depending on the situation at the time.15 The Soviet nostalgia and the stress on being and 
having been the best and purest east Slavs has worked well for Belarus in maintaining 
connections with Russia to the point of the pursuit of a union fusing the two countries 
either into one country or into partners with equal status. Lukashenka supported this unity 
while defending independence.  A new federation with Russia could act as a way to 
preserve independence; otherwise Belarus would have to accept the consequences of 
independence, both positive and negative. This relationship with Russia worked well for 
Lukashenka as it saved the Belarusian economy in the 1990s; however, today the two 
countries have different goals economically, where Belarus looks to the Soviet past and 
somehow being more Russian than the Russians, as Russia looks to a post-Soviet and 
capitalist future.  
Belarus deviated from typical post-soviet transitions in that there was no transition 
and the Belarus experiences international criticism because of this. Lukashenka looked at 
the transitions in other post-Soviet countries, particularly its close neighbors of Lithuania, 
Russia, and Ukraine as cautionary tales; Lithuania appeased the European Union and 
                                                          
14 Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political 
Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 3 (2000): 536 
15 Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political 
Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 3 (2000): 526 
12 
 
seemed to be doing no better than Belarus with no transition, and Russia and Ukraine 
experienced wild capitalism, something that Belarus hoped to avoid.16 This deviation in 
transition entrusted Belarus and Lukashenka with a unique political regime.  Matsuzato 
describes Lukashenka’s regime as a populist one and that populists use ideologies 
instrumentally.  This suggests that Lukashenka does not have a clear concrete ideology 
but instead uses specific ideologies that would support his regime and grant him support 
from the Belarusian people. One of the ideological methods in use by the Lukashenka’s 
regime, especially in the 1990s, was anti-elitism.17 Anti-elitism became institutionalized 
and systematic, making it possible for Lukashenka to resist western pressure since the 
European Union, in his view, was comprised of elites trying to impose their will onto 
Belarus. Under Lukashenka’s regime, Belarusian elites are more vulnerable than the 
opposition.18 Lukashenka does not focus on the opposition as much because it will cause 
international scrutiny, whereas the West does not seem to care much about large business 
owners being charged with tax evasion or whatever other allegations imposed against 
them in order to nationalize their companies. The Belarusian people see the opposition as 
evil and financed by foreigners and the Lukashenka is their populist protector against 
these elites trying to ruin Belarusian society. 19 Anti-elite sentiment more than likely 
                                                          
16 Kimitaka Matsuzato, “A Populist Island in an Ocean of Clan Politics: The 
Lukashenka Regime as an Exception among CIS Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, 
no. 2 (2004): 240 
17 Kimitaka Matsuzato, “A Populist Island in an Ocean of Clan Politics: The 
Lukashenka Regime as an Exception among CIS Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, 
no. 2 (2004): 238-239 
18 Kimitaka Matsuzato, “A Populist Island in an Ocean of Clan Politics: The 
Lukashenka Regime as an Exception among CIS Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, 
no. 2 (2004): 256 
19 Kimitaka Matsuzato, “A Populist Island in an Ocean of Clan Politics: The 
Lukashenka Regime as an Exception among CIS Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, 
no. 2 (2004): 240 
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already existed in the Belarusian people and Lukashenka’s regime may just reflect this 
attitude already present in Belarus.   
The next point Matsuzato makes is that the Belarusian mentality primed the 
population to be susceptible to populist promises due to their “lack of self-satirizing 
humor, easy-going buoyancy, and sound cynicism”, which Russian and Ukrainians both 
have and why they transitioned differently than Belarus.20 This suggests that the mentality 
of the Belarusian people, the fear of out-of-control capitalism, and anti-elitism all support 
the populist Lukashenka regime, ideologies that Lukashenka either uses for his own 
benefit or for the benefit of the Belarusian people by reflecting the needs and wants of the 
Belarusian people.  
2.2. Opinions of Belarusian Elites 
The elites in Belarus are not one indistinguishable group of people. The elites in 
Belarus have differing political views and scholars claim that regarding the Belarusian 
elites it is difficult to tell whether or not the views expressed by the elites are in fact their 
real views or if they are pretense. However, this is true in every aspect of humanity where 
there is no way to tell for certain if what someone reflects what they truly believe, not 
only among Belarusian elites. Prior to 2000, the Soviet elite still dominated Belarusian 
politics until they began aging and later new elites took hold. The original Soviet elite 
that still held influence even after Lukashenka came to power influenced Belarusian 
politics in that they had no desire to pursue a national rebirth and during the final days of 
the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic they had no interest in Belarusian independence. 
These same elites remained in influential spheres for another decade shaping the 
                                                          
20 Kimitaka Matsuzato, “A Populist Island in an Ocean of Clan Politics: The 
Lukashenka Regime as an Exception among CIS Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, 
no. 2 (2004): 242 
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Belarusian identity and contributing to the Soviet nostalgia present in the Lukashenka 
regime. In 1994 after Lukashenka became president, there were factions of the elites who 
wanted to pursue a national revival but others who supported the post-Soviet nostalgia 
and a more authoritarian type regime in Belarus instead of democracy. One reason why 
they supported this regime instead of supporting a more pro-Belarusian nationalism 
course is due to pragmatic reasons such as Lukashenka offering high-paid positions to 
hardline communist supporters.21  
Volha Abramava, Belarusian elite, believes that the Belarusian identity is closed 
and resistant to change. The political system in Belarus will not change because 
Belarusians do not want change, she proposes, and the only way for change to occur in 
Belarusian politics would be to completely overhaul the Belarusian national character, 
something that would take centuries to occur if this was even a viable option to the 
Belarusian people. Abramava insists that it is unacceptable that others do not accept the 
Belarusian character for what it is and instead continue to insist upon a change in the 
country that could not occur even if the political system in Belarus was open to it because 
of the mentality of the people. She believes that the Belarusian people are not radical in 
any aspects of their lives, and that this is reflected in the politics.22 Abramava’s point is 
sound; however, it is difficult to say what it is exactly that the Belarusian people want, 
especially from democratic polities who claim that the voice of the Belarusian people 
cannot be heard since elections are not fair and not free. Iryna Buhrova, another 
Belarusian elite, on the other hand does not think that a Belarusian identity currently exists 
                                                          
21 Yauhen Babosau. “Should Belarus make a strategic Choice?” in Belarus: Neither 
Europe, nor Russia, ed. Valer Bulhakau and Agnieszka Komorowska (Warsaw: Stefan 
Batory Foundation, 2006), 221 
22 Volha Abramava, “Does Belarusian Identity exist?” in Belarus: Neither Europe, nor 
Russia, ed. Valer Bulhakau and Agnieszka Komorowska (Warsaw: Stefan Batory 
Foundation, 2006), 111-112 
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it a completely solidified form. She claims that now finally Belarusians do want 
recognition in order to reinforce their identity in order for it to become solidified.23 
Belarusians can say who they are as much as they like and claim to have a certain identity, 
but this claim is moot unless outsiders recognize their identity as legitimate and worth 
taking seriously. It is important for Belarusians and any other nation to feel recognized 
by others because it is hard to take oneself seriously or recognize their own identity if 
everyone else tells them that they are wrong. For example, Belarusians feel they are 
Belarusian, yet outsiders tell them they are just an extension of Russia or that due to the 
Lukashenka regime, Belarusians are not able to be themselves anyway so their whole 
identity does not deserve acknowledgement. Dozens of Belarusian elites seek to describe 
what the Belarusian identity. The main descriptions are that Belarusians do not have an 
identity yet or maybe never will, Belarusians have an identity but the West and/or others 
do not want to accept this identity, and finally that the Belarusian identity is rooted more 
in Polish identity or Russian identity. Referring back to elite Abramava’s point that the 
mentality of the people is reflected in politics and not the other way around, Abramava 
claims that Belarusians are cautious in their mentality and not radicals. This would 
explain the policies present in the Belarusian foreign policy, in which President 
Lukashenka does not want to make any concrete unions with any of its partners. Belarus 
keeps itself closed because some elites believe that is simply what the Belarusians want 
and they are hesitant to accept outside influence, although they are at times forced to. 
Henadz Buraukin states that “Belarusian identity seems to exist” but even so their “sense” 
of identity does not exist like it does for other nations because they do not respect 
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themselves and their national symbols. Further, he thinks that although the politicians try 
to reflect what the people want, i.e. caution when dealing with others and closedness, in 
rhetoric, in reality they are a part of a globalization trend towards cosmopolitanism, in 
lieu of the mentality of the Belarusian people, which would want the opposite if they are 
in fact as closed as some elites claim they are.24 
Andrey Sannikau strongly believes that the only way for the Belarusian identity 
to flourish would be to join the European Union and become more strongly integrated 
with the polity.  Currently, Western organizations and governments support Belarusian 
nationalism as a means to encourage Belarus to become a more open society, sway the 
country away from Russia, and motivate Belarus to work more closely with the EU. 
Hypothetically the closer that Belarus becomes to the EU and the more cooperative 
Belarus is to working with the EU, the less the EU would support nationalism in Belarus. 
This is the typical pattern among the EU is that they supported nationalisms in countries 
in order for the country to become more open and willing to work with the EU and then 
later after integration the support for nationalism disappears and nationalism becomes an 
undesirable quality.  This would be no different in Belarus. Belarusian elites who think 
that the survival and revival of the Belarusian identity depends on a close relationship 
with the EU are only looking at the short-sighted goal instead of what would happen in 
the long term. The national revivals so crucial in the Czech Republic and Poland for 
example are no longer encouraged like they were during the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and instead became problematic for older EU member-states. At present for nationalists, 
Europe remains a dream and idyllic place where once Belarus returns to Europe, the 
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Belarusian identity will finally be able to flourish.  This may be, but many of the 
nationalists do not think about what the long-term consequences for the Belarusian 
identity would be to integrate with the EU. Many Belarusians instead view Europe as a 
viable option for trade and other pragmatic reasons but not as a cultural or political 
partner.25  
Lukashenka’s regime strongly emphasizes Soviet nostalgia and has since the 
1990s when Lukashenka first became president. Even so, the general consensus among 
the Belarusian elites is that they and the Belarusian people in general do not feel a sense 
of Soviet comradery as much as they do a shared connection with other Slavs like the 
Czechs, Poles, or even Croatians. Even so, the connection with other Slavs does not 
overshadow the fact that the Belarusians see themselves as distinct in the Slavic world, 
like any other Slavic people.   
What Belarus lacks is a clear set of defining characteristics designated to the 
Belarusian people that distinguish the country from other Slavic nations. Belarusians can 
feel a difference between themselves and other Slavs but they do not know how to clearly 
describe this difference. This is problematic because then if they do not have their own 
description of themselves, then other people might dismiss the Belarusian identity as not 
existing. And if a definition of Belarusian identity does not exist by the Belarusians, others 
will try to define the nation for them, as many already have done. What Lukashenka has 
done is taken the void of a concrete national identity and try to formulate a Belarusian 
                                                          
25 Andrey Sannikau, “Does Belarusian Identity exist?” in Belarus: Neither Europe, nor 
Russia, ed. Valer Bulhakau and Agnieszka Komorowska (Warsaw: Stefan Batory 




identity that may very well reflect the needs and wants of the Belarusian people but also 
perhaps coincidentally helps to secure his own regime and interests.  
2.3. Belarusian National Identity and its Relation to Foreign Policy   
Analyst Natalia Leshchenko discusses the basis for foreign policy in Belarus. She 
argues that Belarusian foreign policy is rooted in the national ideology of Belarus, which 
is based on collectivism, anti-liberalism, and not ethnically based. Lukashenka created 
this national ideology to help cement his own power and uses it to his advantage 
depending on the situation at hand. The core of Lukashenka’s regime is that he wants to 
protect the country’s national ideology against foreign influences. He uses rhetoric to 
describe the threat of the European Union to the sovereignty of Belarus. Pressure from 
the West for Belarus to adopt a democratic regime only strengthens Lukashenka’s 
political power. Lukashenka views market reforms and democracy as alien to the national 
ideology for Belarus, opted out of the path to democracy unlike other post-soviet states, 
and uses national sovereignty as a shield against the west.26  
Lukashenka also uses this national ideology towards foreign relations with Russia. 
Lukashenka kept close relations with Russia from 1994 onwards. The close relationship 
with Russia fit the national narrative Lukashenka was propagating, based on history and 
Soviet nostalgia. The partnership with Russia was an ideological partnership for 
Lukashenka without any concrete economic ties. In 2007 Russia changed its tone and 
decided to adopt a more economic and pragmatic approach in its foreign policy and 
decided to raise gas and oil prices for Belarus. Because the close relationship with Russia 
was based on ideology, Belarus was able to change its narrative and loosen its ties to 
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Russia and gain sympathy from the west. All of these actions are based on Lukashenka’s 
desire to keep power through claiming to protect the national ideology of Belarus. This 
keeps the foreign policy of Belarus fluid and changeable, able to fit the needs of whatever 
will grant Lukashenka more popular support. Leshchenko concludes by stating that 
Belarus is now searching for other sources of economic sustainability, as it can no longer 
rely solely on Russia, despite never being directly dependent on Russia.27   
2.4. Concluding Remarks on Belarusian National Identity  
 Scholars acknowledge the interplay between Belarusian national identity and 
policy-making. The national identity in Belarus has not been concretely defined but there 
are certain characteristics that seem to define the Belarusian people, although not typical 
distinguishing characteristics like language or religion.  The key features of Belarusian 
identity are Soviet-nostalgia, “Little Russianism”, and a general resistance to change in 
the Belarusian mentality. There are, of course, many other characteristics of the 
Belarusian people. Nevertheless, these features seem to have the most impact on 
Lukashenka and his regime and can be seen manifested into Belarus’ foreign policy.  
5. Multi-Vectors in Foreign Policy  
The official foreign policy of Belarus is a multi-vector approach. Belarus seeks 
cooperation with every continent, even in light of tense diplomatic relations between 
Belarus and some other polities. For example, Belarus maintains that it encourages 
cooperation with the United States and that all issues between the two countries were first 
initiated by and continue due to the United States government, although the official policy 
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does not state the roots of the issues the United States has with the Belarusian government. 
In the mid-2000s, many changes occurred in Belarus regarding its foreign policy. In 2006-
2007, Belarus and Russia had a conflict regarding oil and gas prices, causing a blow to 
the relations between the two countries. During this same period, Belarus began 
strengthening its ties with Latin American countries and with China. Additionally, in 
2006 the United States and other western countries imposed sanctions on Belarusian 
companies. These issues with the big powers of both the West and Russia and the new 
developments in relationships with other regions suggests some correlation. With the 
European Union, the United States, and CIS, Belarus states that it wants to have mutually 
beneficially relations with them based on respect, equality, and cooperation with each 
other. Belarus clearly states this because due to its size, location, and history, Belarus 
often falls into the role of dependency and today seeks to be considered as an equal in its 
relationship with others. Lukashenka demonstrates this by holding firm with his policies 
despite sometimes intense pressure from the international community. Although not a 
member, Belarus states it cooperates with the European Union, Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, and NATO.2829  
5.1. Belarus and Russia 
Although also a member-state of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Belarus defines its relationship with Russia separately 
from the rest of CIS. The two countries have a special relationship that differs from 
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Belarus’ relationship with any other polity in the world. The official policy acknowledges 
all of the factors contributing to the relationship between Belarus and Russia and why the 
two are so interconnected and how Belarus plans to maintain this connention, but in a 
way where Belarus is not entirely dependent on Russia, or at least does not appear to be 
dependent. As stated by the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Belarus “an extensive mutual 
agenda is determined by a set of geographical, geopolitical, historical and other factors, 
complementarity of the two economies, and close cooperation between our 
enterprises”.30 I give special attention to this relationship due to its significance.  
5.1.1. Belarus-Russia Relations in depth 
Bilateral relations with Russia are stronger than the bilateral relations of Belarus 
with any other country.31  Belarus is not only connected to Russia economically, but also 
Belarus and Russia are vastly interconnected though military cooperation, free borders 
between the two countries, and they share the same language.32 For over 200 years 
Belarus and Russia belonged to the same political body until Belarus became an 
independent country in 1993. Since then, the relationship between Belarus and Russia has 
been complex and appear to be a love/hate relationship where on one hand Belarusians 
and Russians realize that they are brothers and deeply connected with each other, but on 
the other hand sometimes they are not very pleased with this connection. Belarus does 
not want to be politically dependent on Russia and appears to have a little brother 
complex, whereas Russia has an air of arrogance towards Belarus where Russia knows 
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that Belarus is economically dependent on Russia and thus acts accordingly. Throughout 
the 1990s, the countries were extremely close and their economies flourished together, 
more so because of Russia than because of Belarus, but the two countries had common 
goals and a common approach for achieving these goals. Things changed in the 2000s 
after Russia developed a more pragmatic approach to its foreign policy and wanted to cut 
back on the perks it was giving to its neighbors in order to retain more money in its own 
economy. For Belarus, a pragmatic foreign policy is being connected with Russia 
economically. However, this approach fails to be practical when Russia takes its own 
practical approach to Belarus. In order to understand the foreign policy of Belarus, it is 
necessary to review the interconnectedness of the Belarusian economy with Russia. 
Starting in the mid-1990s, Economic growth in Belarus has been highly dependent on a 
special relationship with Russia. In 1994, economic ties with Russia with severed but in 
1996 they were once again restored and this marked huge economic growth in Belarus.33  
In 1991 Belarus became an independent nation but the rest of the 1990s marked a period 
of “reintegration” with Russia.34 Lukashenka was quite popular at the time and a big 
advocate for integration with Russia and later a union, realizing he had a high chance 
against Yeltsin of gaining a powerful position within the union.35 However, after 2001 
Lukashenka abandoned many of the concrete measures he promised regarding the union, 
i.e. a single monetary system. Lukashenka further prevented Russian business owners 
from buying their way into Belarusian industries.36  Ioffe views the reason behind the 
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demotivation for the Union State as stemming from Belarus’ coming into its own as its 
own nation and using its close ties with Russia to its own advantage while simultaneously 
weakening Russia’s influence on Belarus.37 
Arguably the source of Belarusian economic success can be attributed to the 
preferential gas and oil prices granted to Belarus from Russia. 38 Lukashenka counts on 
Russian subsides, either direct or indirect, and uses his transit location as a bargaining 
chip.39 Belarus is crucially dependent on imports of energy from one source—Russia, and 
Belarus has a higher rate of energy usage than other former republics such as Ukraine. 
Belarus relies on Russia for industrial exports, is almost 100% dependent on Russia for 
gas, and is about 90% dependent on Russia for oil imports.40  
Export is one example of Belarus ’relationship with Russia and the vast percentage 
of products that are exported to Russia. Export is a big component of the Belarusian 
economy. In 2005, exports in Belarus accounted for 54% of its GDP. Belarus is active 
within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in general, but is particularly 
active in its participation with Russia. Within the CIS, Russia receives 80.6% of the 
exports from Belarus. Not only does Belarus export the majority of its products to Russia, 
most of Belarus’ imports come from Russia accounting for 90.8% of its imports coming 
from Russia.  After receiving many raw materials and semi-finished products from 
Russia, Belarus then exports finished value-added products to Russia. Belarus exports to 
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Russia because Belarusian products are not as competitive in the West as they are in 
Russia so in this sense there is no reason for Belarus to reorient its trade relations and 
additionally no want by the West either. By means of the capital acquired through 
exporting to Russia, this allows the necessary capital for Belarusians to participate in 
Western markets. This is significant for Belarus has it allows for less dependence on 
Russia. Advantageous for Russia, Belarus also acts as a significant transit country for oil 
and gas from Russia transported to the European Union where 50% of oil products and 
20% of gas exported from Russia to the European Union goes through Belarus.41  In sum, 
Belarusian industries are all deeply integrated with Russia. Belarus is a key producer of 
fuel for Europe and is a large producer of machinery and radio electronics. Belarusian 
industries are all deeply integrated with Russia as Belarus depends on some raw materials 
and on parts/semi-finished products imported from Russia. Some industries are also 
highly attached to some major Russian consumers. 42 
The special bond between Belarus and Russia has changed in recent decades after 
each country adopted different paths during transition. Russia is no longer a “source of 
inspiration” for Belarus since Russia has moved on to more pragmatic approaches in its 
foreign policy, even with Belarus. On the contrary, the transition from communism to 
capitalism in Russia acts as an image of what Belarus hopes to avoid. Additionally, Russia 
seeks to work with many Western political and financial groups in order to benefit 
themselves.43  Russia does not view itself as being an equal with Belarus. Russia was 
outraged that the European Union continues the attempt to treat Russia the same as 
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Belarus, and other countries such as Moldova and countries in North Africa. 44 The Union 
State between Russia and Belarus has not been successful as Russia based the Union State 
on economic principles and Belarus based the union on political principles.45 
The change in the relationship between Belarus and Russia is apparent in the 
2006/2007 oil crisis between the two countries. In 2006 there was an investment boom in 
Belarus, of which only 3% was foreign investment. This investment boom was 
conditional on the direct and indirect subsidies from Russia, ranging anywhere from $3 
billion up to $10 billion. At the end of 2006, Russia decided to cut back on subsidies, in 
part because Russia realized that Belarus was exchanging empty promises for financial 
aid. Yegor Gaidar, a Russian economist, described Belarus as a self-imposed burden on 
Russia.  Belarus received many special benefits from Russia, especially regarding gas and 
oil. Belarus is still dependent on Russia for cheap oil and gas prices, which amount to 
savings contributing to 41% of the Belarusian budget; however, the prices are much 
higher now than they were in prior to 2006/2007.46 The gas and oil dilemma in 2007 left 
Belarus with western sympathy.47  Nevertheless, still there is close military cooperation 
between Russia and Belarus and Russia has attempted to gain control of the parts of the 
Belarusian defense industry. Over the past 15 years, Belarus has enjoyed good gas prices 
and deliveries of crude oil without customs duties. Since 2007, Russia has focused more 
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on its own self-interests instead of working in a way to sway Belarus from aligning with 
the West. 48 
5.2. Belarus and CIS 
“The development of bilateral cooperation with the CIS member states is one of 
the priorities of the foreign policy and foreign economic relations of the Republic of 
Belarus. These priorities are based on a number of historical, economic, political and 
cultural factors”, states the official foreign policy page of Belarus. The headquarters for 
CIS is in Minsk. Belarus is a member of many organizations that include CIS member 
states such as the Customs Union, EurAsEc, the Union State, and the Single Economic 
Space. Through these organizations Belarus enjoys a wide array of economic benefits, so 
despite its multi-vector approach to foreign policy, trade remains very high within this 
region.49  
Belarus still remains very active within the CIS with trade. Since 1995, over half 
of the trade turnover in Belarus has been with CIS. Between Belarus and Russia, trade 
turnover has decreased about 12% between 2000 and 2005; however, imports remain high 
from Russia, whereas Belarusian exports to Russia are rapidly declining. Belarus is 
exceptional in this case among other CIS members. Trade turnover with the European 
Union between 1995 and 2005 has increased slightly, but remains at about 30%. Trade 
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turnover between Belarus and Asia between 1995 and 2005 increased from about 2% to 
over 4%.50  
5.3. Belarus and Africa/Asia 
Belarus has diplomatic relations with the majority of African countries, hoping to 
expand its export market to the continent. Additionally, Belarus has diplomatic relations 
with many Middle Eastern countries. Despite extensive cooperation with China in recent 
years, China is surprisingly absent from the foreign policy section devoted to Africa and 
Asia, which only concentrates on Africa and the Middle East.51  
6.3.1. China 
Despite the lack of any mention of China by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Belarus, various news sources continue to cover Belarus’ growing relationship with 
China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus does explicitly mention the China-
Belarus Industrial Park, “Great Stone”. The idea for this park came way in 2010. Belarus 
and China are working together to create this park, which will be located near Minsk, in 
order to attract investment. The park ought to be attractive to investors due to its special 
legal status which would make business less complicated for those living in the area. The 
project in itself is slightly confusing. It is not clear if this is meant to be a residential 
community as well or what type of businesses that Belarus/China hopes to attract. The 
benefit for Belarus is that this park allows for Chinese capital to flow to Belarus as they 
are both working together on this project, but the benefits for Chinese investors are not 
entirely clear either. Perhaps this is a way for the Chinese government to try and make its 
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way into Europe, starting first in Belarus and making its way further in to other countries. 
China will invest more than triple of that of Belarus ($1.5 billion to 500 million, 
respectively). Both China and Belarus will govern the park. The latest developments in 
this park were in 2013 and it appears that nothing concrete has yet taken place regarding 
investment or even construction. Lukashenka supports this project and thinks it will boost 
the economy of Belarus. The implications of a project like this remain to be seen as this 
could have adverse effects on Belarus from Russia, on whom Belarus still has, at the very 
least, some degree of dependence.52 
This is not the only project underway between Belarus and China. The two 
countries also have a visa-free travel agreement and Belarus cooperates with the Shanghai 
Cooperation Agreement (SCO), of which it is not a member. Including Belarus, all the 
members of the SCO are also members are EurAsEC, excluding Uzbekistan and China. 
This means that Belarus has strong connections with the members of SCO and its own 
prerogatives for working with the organization.5354 
5.5. Belarus and the Americas 
Cooperation between Belarus and Latin America has been steadily increasing 
since the mid-2000s. Official policy in Belarus describes cooperation with Latin America 
as necessary in a multi-vectored world. Belarus views cooperation politically and 
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economically with Latin America as a starting point for integration into the world trade 
networks. There is a perceived connection between Belarus and Latin America in that 
both hold similar positions within the United Nations. Additionally, the type and structure 
of their economies complement each other. One of the main partners in Latin America 
for Belarus is Venezuela, described as “fruitful cooperation”. Belarusian companies and 
enterprises in oil extraction and heavy machinery construction are currently present in 
Venezuela.  Furthermore, Belarus opened two schools named after Venezuelan national 
heroes and in 2009 opened a Venezuelan cultural center in Minsk. Belarus also has a 
strong partnership with Brazil. Belarus views Latin America as a “viable alternative to 
[their] traditional markets” and seeks long-term partnerships, despite the region needing 
“substantial material and intellectual resources” for market development.  Belarusian 
exports to the region appear to be the main connection between the Belarus and Latin 
America.55 Former president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez pursued an anti-American 
coalition with countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and also Belarus.  Chavez did not 
view the relationship with Belarus as crucial for pragmatic reasons but more so in his 
pursuit of an alliance of countries with leftist ideals against the United States. The tense 
relationship between Belarus and the United States and the EU made this relationship 
with Venezuela all the more attractive for Belarus. The demands of the USA and the EU 
for Belarus to radically change its government and for Lukashenka‘s regime to end 
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allowed for Belarus to seek another direction in its foreign policy and demonstrate that it 
would not appease Western governments.5657  
5.5.1. United States 
The United States is the biggest critic of Belarus and Lukashenka’s regime. 
Various leaders from the United Stated have described Belarus as tyranny, evil, and a 
dictatorship. The official policy supports democratization and free elections. In the 
economic sector, the United States supports Belarus becoming market economy as the 
current economic situation of Belarus makes for a “challenging business environment”. 
Belarus claims the United States as a strong partner in trade, but acknowledges the 
political tensions between the two countries, although emphasizes it is on the side of the 
United States and that Belarus remains open to working together with the United States.58 
The release of political prisoners signifies that Belarus still does have some 
dependence and is subject to external pressures. The releasing of political prisoners 
happened after Belarus publically announced that it supported the Ukrainian revolution 
and the new president, Petro Poroshenko.59 This is an example of Belarus teetering 
between Russia and the west and Lukashenka using the current political climate in the 
world to his own advantage to support the needs of Belarus. Lukashenka saw the 
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opportunity to potentially gain some financial support from the European Union and 
indeed many sanctions were lifted against Belarus. 
5.6. Belarus and the European Union  
Belarus has an important relationship with the European Union, where it views 
itself as providing extensive security to the EU and Belarus describes itself as a transit 
country, ensuring safe transit of oil and gas from Russia to the European Union. Belarus 
emphasizes the “development of friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with 
the EU Member States” as the European Union is the second biggest export market for 
Belarus after Russia. However, Belarus official policy acknowledges the political 
tensions and economic difficulties. Furthermore, Belarus does not enjoy preferential tariff 
rates from the European Union so exporting to the EU proves to be more expensive than 
exporting to countries with Belarus has partnerships with, i.e. many CIS countries, 
particularly Russia. Belarus’ main prerogative in the EU currently is to increase 
investments in Belarus by setting up information networks in different countries 
throughout the European Union.60 
5.6.1. European Union Policy towards Belarus 
Officially, the European Union’s bases its foreign policy to Belarus on the Eastern 
Partnership, which is a partnership between the European Union and 6 other countries, 
Belarus included. The EU supports democracy and market economies within this 
partnership; however, due to political issues the EU has with Belarus, Belarus receives 
special treatment from the EU, different than the other members of the Eastern 
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Partnership. The European Union’s policy towards Belarus is markedly different than 
Belarus’ policy towards the European Union. Belarus emphasizes economic cooperation 
and wishes to increase investment from European Union countries in Belarus, strengthen 
its already existing strong trade partners such as Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands, 
and create new strong relations with and encourage investment with other EU member-
states such as the Czech Republic. In contrast, the policy of the European Union towards 
states that due to concerns about human rights, the European Union has a “policy of 
critical engagement” towards Belarus. There is no mention of economic cooperation 
besides that the European Union’s made priority financially is to continue to fund civil 
society. The European Union sees Belarus as non-democratic and in need of serious 
reform in most spheres of political life. The European Union demands that the Belarusian 
government releases political prisoners (which Belarus has done), abolishes the death 
penalty, and establishes a democratic government. The concern of the European Union 
lies with the Belarusian people, whom the European Union sees as repressed, not free, 
and living in a country that has not undergone modernization. 61 Individual member-states 
of the European Union also have their own policies towards Belarus. The Netherlands, 
for example, invested nearly 2 billion US dollars in Belarus in 2014 alone. The 
Netherlands is a huge trading partner with Belarus. The Netherlands works with Belarus 
finically but still emphasizes its concern on human rights in Belarus and the official 
granting of funds to Belarus is only done under the stipulation that the funds support civil 
social and the support of a “pluralist democratic society”; although, the Netherlands’ 
policy states that merely that initiatives towards these goals must be put into place, not 
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necessarily that these requirements be fulfilled.62 The difference between the two policies 
is striking. Belarus maintains that it seeks mutually beneficial relations with the European 
Union and demands respect. Belarusian foreign policy glosses over the fact that the 
perceived issue of human rights is what deters the development of economic relations 
with the European Union and instead attributes the lagging of economic improvement is 
due to the weakening of the Euro-zone and a bad investment climate in general. The 
European Union, on the other hand, strongly emphasizes what they view as a lack of 
freedom and democracy in Belarus and feel this is an issue that must be resolved 
immediately. The foreign policy towards Belarus from the EU involves sanctions against 
individuals and companies, financial support to civil society, and pressure for political 
reforms. Some sanctions have recently been lifted after the release of political prisoners 
in Belarus. 
5.7. Summary of Multi-Vector Foreign Policy 
Belarus uses a multi-vector approach in order to create new connections. The 
political implications of these connections are clear and the reason behind the 
interdependence used by Belarus in order to create another realm in which countries with 
similar interests can operate outside of the sphere of western influence. Belarus’ 
relationship with Russia is more complicated. Belarus is already deeply entrenched in 
Russia’s sphere of influence and prior to the 2000s at least, had in practice (although not 
officially) a uni-vector approach to foreign policy pointing in the direction of Russia. A 
uni-vector policy relying on one influential neighbor left Belarus vulnerable and in a state 
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of dependence. The dependence, or rather the susceptibility of Belarus to Russia’s foreign 
policies, left Belarus in a position where it did not know the future of the state of affairs 
in Belarus. Russia did not want to give Belarus or other neighbors as preferential of 
treatment as it had in the past (though still preferential treatment). When trying to 
establish new connections it is impossible to do this without having economic stability. 
Belarus developed its economic stability in the 1990s through Russia. There is no denial 
that without reconnecting the ties with Russia in the 1990s, Belarus would not have seen 
as much, or perhaps any, economic success. There is a cycle of dependence and 
interdependence.  
The two vectors with the most influence on Belarus and with whom Belarus 
interacts the most are the west (primarily the EU) and Russia. The political pressure 
exerted on Belarus has caused Belarus to appease some demands from the EU and the 
United States, for example the release of political prisoners in Belarus. Belarus’ interest 
in encouraging investment from EU countries and increasing economic relations as whole 
with the European Union caused Belarus to enter into a realm of dependence on the EU.  
The role of interdependence in Belarusian foreign policy is clear. The United States and 
the European Union both exert political pressure on Belarus in order to try and coerce 
Belarus into changing its regime to something that these polities want. Russia does the 
same thing. The reliance on outside actors does not correspond to the goals of the official 
policy of Belarus foreign policy or mutually respectful partnerships.63 
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5.7.1. Opinions of Belarusian Elite on Relations with Europe (EU) 
Elite Usevalad Yancheuski blatantly states that the European Union does not have 
any interest in understanding Belarus and simply looks down upon the country. He states 
that Belarusians do not need the EU and do not care about any sanctions or restrictions 
that the EU granted to Belarus. Belarusians do not care because they do not need help 
from the European Union and simply like the system they have in place. He describes the 
stance of the EU towards Belarus as coming from a position of arrogance, that is the 
European Union thinks that the Belarusian government came to be only by accident and 
that the Belarusian people would give anything for Belarusian society to open up, 
abandon its Sovietesque regime, and finally be able to experience all the wonders 
associated with having a close relationship with the EU. Yancheuski emphasizes that 
Belarusians simply do not care about having a close relationship with Europe, neither 
ideologically nor even pragmatically.64 He is not the only elite in Belarus who feels this 
way with the majority of those interviewed in 2006 following the presidential election by 
the Stefan Batory Foundation, a foundation “guided by principles of transparency and 
accountability”. 65 A common view among the elites is that the EU does not have a clear 
policy towards Belarus. They are under the impression that the EU and the United States 
merely adopted a stance in 1996 and have not adapted this stance since then.  The system 
in Belarus has been in place for over 20 years and many Belarus elites think that it is time 
for Western polities to finally accept that this whether or not this regime is what every 
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Belarusian wants, the system is not changing any time soon and Lukashenka is not going 
away, despite the constant futile attempts of the United States and the European Union to 
influence and shape the Belarusian government in a way that would better suit their 
interests.  
Scholar Andrey Kazakevich describes the “European path” as merely being 
hypothetical and not a real issue in Belarusian politics because the regime has no intention 
to pursue a stronger relationship with the European Union for reasons other than to attract 
investment in Belarus or support a stronger trade relationship between the two polities. 
Belarusians see themselves as a part of Europe geographically but only in this way. There 
is no question as to whether or not Belarus is a part of Europe; however, Belarus does not 
belong to or want to belong to the ideological Europe and its set of values and culture and 
the elites do not think Belarus belongs to Europe in this sense. For today’s youth Europe 
is a synonym for the European Union and the post-Soviet elite feels positive towards 
Europe as an economic partner but this as far as these elites want to work with the EU. 
Russia remains as the cultural and traditional partner for Belarus but many are willing to 
work with the EU if it will lead to economic cooperation. After the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and a revival of Russian nationalism in Russia, a national movement among some 
elites in opposition to the post-Soviet elites arose in order to shield Belarus from the 
potential threat of Russia trying to spread its Russianism to Belarus. The national revival 
in Russia expressed itself mainly as pan-Russianism according to Kazakevich and led to 
pro-European sentiment among some in Belarus as a shield towards this potential pan-
Russianism. Until 1994, the national elites and the Soviet elites worked together, but the 
national movement was more successful until Lukashenka came to power. Soviet symbols 
instead replaced the national symbols that the Soviet and national elites had agreed upon 
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and since 1996 the nationalists have not been allowed in the Belarusian government. 66 
Most Belarusian elites are neither hard-line communists and Soviet-sympathizes nor pro-
Western oppositional elites. The majority of elites in Belarus have views all along this 
spectrum but voice that they are in favor of the views that correspond to the system in 
place. These elites seized the opportunity to receive preferential treatment by being 
friends of Lukashenka or having other connections that enabled them to slowly advance. 
This demonstrates that people are often more motived by pragmatic reasons than by 
ideological ones since many Belarusian elites are willing to say whatever they have to say 
in order to make more money.  These elites are much more similar to the Soviet elites in 
that they share the same stance on Europe being a geographical notion more so than a 
place that Belarus shares the same politics or culture. This clash is evident in how the two 
polities interact with each other. The European Union has specific demands of Belarus to 
change its political system but Belarus does not want to change and stresses that the EU, 
and more so the United States, are trying to impose their will upon the Belarus instead of 
acknowledging and accepting that Belarus has chosen to take a different path than the 
EU. Kazakevich views the foreign policy of Belarus as showing no signs of changing due 
to the cynical attitude of young people towards the EU. These young people are not just 
cynical because of propaganda from the Belarusian government but they themselves do 
not want to deal with the EU and all its problems. Most young people do not see Europe 
as this idyllic place that Belarus will hopefully “return” to. Even the nationalistic elites 
views integrating with Europe as a pragmatic approach to protect Belarus from Russian 
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nationalism because the EU would gladly support Belarusian nationalism and anything 
else that would counter Russia.67  
Elites view that Belarus has a lot to offer Europe. The EU would benefit the most 
by working with the “well-educated, hard-working, and gifted people” of Belarus.68  
Elites are in agreement that the people of Belarus and their culture are the most valuable 
asset that Belarus has to offer. They assert that the Belarusian people are obedient almost 
to a fault, an asset that would greatly benefit the rest of Europe. Additionally, most of the 
elites share the consensus that Belarus would act as another component to the variety of 
cultures in Europe already and would contribute culture and art as well. Belarusians see 
themselves as having a lot to offer the outside world and view economic and other 
pragmatic assets that they could offer to Europe as secondary.  
Three attitudes exist towards Europe among Belarusian elites: neutral, idyllic, and 
opposing.  Most elites view Europe in a neutral way claiming that Europe provides a lot 
of cultural and historical significance and could be a potential economic partner. In 
contrast, some elites view Europe as an idyllic utopia that Belarus longs to return to and 
crucial for Belarusians to be a part of if they want their national identity to flourish.  The 
elites who hold this view point are the nationalist elites whose goal is for Belarus to 
become completely de-Russified and de-Sovietized and join the democratic Europe. The 
third opinion is that of those who oppose the EU and do not appreciate the impositions 
upon Belarus from the European Union.  These elites view Europe in a similar way as 
those who view Europe in a neutral way and have the additional characteristic of not 
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appreciating the attempt of the EU to meddle in Belarusian affairs and claim that the EU 
does not understand Belarus at all and they do not want to understand Belarus either.  
The national character of the Belarusian people and the Lukashenka regime shape 
Belarusian politics.  One of the biggest driving forces behind Belarusian politics is Soviet 
nostalgia. Another crucial force that elites, scholars, and politicians often discuss is the 
Belarusian mentality. A significant component of the mentality of the Belarusian people 
is their reluctance for chance and desire for security. They desire security from the state 
and Lukashenka adopted a father-figure role to the Belarusian people. All of these factors 
together contribute to how Belarus deals with the international community.  At present, 
it appears that Belarus is changing its traditional stances on its position in the international 
sphere and hopes to become more open to the possibilities of working with Europe, China, 
Latin America, and even expresses openness to working with the United States. Despite 
the movement towards more open policies with other partners, Belarusians are still 
reluctant to change and a drastic change in the status quo of Belarus is unlikely.  
In a sense the regime in place in Belarus happened by accident since most of the 
elites who support Lukashenka are merely opportunists wishing to further their own 
careers. Because of this, it is hard to see what is real in the regime or what is not and who 
truly believes whatever ideology they say they believe.  
6. Discussion  
There exists a dichotomy between nationalism and the interests of the Belarusian 
state. The difference lies between maintaining and justifying Belarus as an independent 
nation-state and the fear Lukashenka has of nationalism and its threat to his regime. 
Scholar Andrej Dynko claims that Lukashenka uses financial pull as a means to keep 
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support. He suppresses the Belarusian language against the desires of the Belarusian 
people as a way to dampen any national movement in Belarus. The motive of Belarusian 
nationalism is to be used as a way to protect against Russian meddling and safeguard the 
country from “the growing appetites of Russian capitalists”. Despite many scholars 
insistence that language is crucial to the existence and survival of a nation as eloquently 
stated by Dynko, “The language’s cultural value is greater than its role as a means of 
communication”, Belarus continues to exist as a state. 69 The foreign policy since the 
1990s in Belarus has reflected how the Belarusian people see themselves and/or how 
Lukashenka views and understands the Belarusian people.  
6.1. Foreign Policy in the 1990s 
Already in 1997, Lukashenka discussed an inclination towards a multi-vectored 
foreign policy.  “Belarus Tomorrow” is a compilation of Lukashenka’s policies and goals 
for Belarus in 1997 and his own personally written book about Belarus’ present and 
future. The book acts as a prediction for many policies in Belarus today and demonstrates 
massive consistency in Lukashenka’s policies. His foreign policy in particular and goals 
for the foreign policy have remained essentially the same over the past nearly 20 years. 
The international sphere has changed; however, the policies in Belarus do not reflect this 
change. The foreign policy within Belarus has barely changed since the 1990s in that the 
policy under Lukashenka has always been a multi-vector one and the government has 
sought an open relationship with multiple partners, not just with one or two major 
partners. Lukashenka stated this when he was deeply entrenched in a relationship with 
Russia. The policy of Belarus has never been one that relies on one partner and officially 
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never only relied on Russia, no matter how close their relationship and how much Belarus 
may rely on Russia. Lukashenka explicitly states that his main objective in foreign policy 
is to not be dependent on any outside player. The official policy since 1997 has not 
changed. Lukashenka officially does not want to be dependent on Russia or Europe or 
anyone else. The reality of the situation in Lukashenka may differ from the official policy 
but officially nothing has changed regarding foreign policy in Belarus. Lukashenka does 
not want to isolate Belarus from the international sphere and stated that this would not 
work for Belarus if the goal is to become an active participant in an ever globalizing 
world. He stated that a multi-vector approach to foreign policy was necessary in order for 
the domestic and international spheres and relations in Belarus to flourish. He 
unambiguously stated that he does not choose a multi-vector foreign policy for Belarus 
out of popularity or because it is the more accepted thing to do today (or in 1997) but 
because this is a necessity for Belarus in Belarus wants to be a part of the global 
community while simultaneously supporting internal interests at home. He uses the policy 
of “think global, act local” in his foreign policy approach. A key difference between 1997 
and today is that Lukashenka explicitly states that in order for Belarus to “think global” a 
path towards Europe is necessary. The only way to become a global player in the 
international sphere would be for Belarus to work closely with Europe, says Lukashenka 
in 1997. This is drastically different than the EU-skepticism present in Belarus today and 
at various times over the past 20 years. He stated that the “direction of Belarusian foreign 
policy is invariable” towards all European structures, including NATO and the European 
Union. Lukashenka stressed the importance of a relationship with China earlier in 1997 
while discussing further potential partners. He saw then almost 20 years ago that China 
could be a important partner for Belarus; however, there is no mention of Latin America 
despite the now strong relationship with many Latin American countries, particularly 
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Argentina and Brazil. In 1997, official Belarusian foreign policy gave priority to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and stressed that any other special treatment 
would not be given to outside players. Nothing ought to be done to “jeopardize the 
integrity” of CIS. CIS today is still important for Belarus. Its importance lies in trade 
where the vast majority of exports from Belarus go the CIS countries, with Russia being 
the most important trading partner. Lukashenka stressed that Belarus ought to look out 
for its interests at home first and then later abroad. He stresses this importance because if 
Belarus is not stable itself, it would be impossible to contribute anything to the global 
community.70  
Foreign policy in Belarus today and also in 1997 has key features. It stresses all 
that the Belarusian people and the Belarus nation has to offer the international community 
and in particular Europe. Belarus wants the nation and its regime to have stability. 
Stability is the first priority of domestic policy in Belarus. This reflects the lack of desire 
for change in Belarus and that most Belarusians want to keep the status quo. Another 
feature of Belarusian foreign policy is unease and concern over being dependent on 
another country or polity. This is the main reason why Belarus officially seeks a multi-
vectored foreign policy. A multi-vector foreign policy decreases dependence because 
Belarus would have more options than merely one or two vectors and less reliance on 
either of these vectors. The less reliance on one or two outsiders, the more secure and 
stable the Belarusian domestic sphere could be, according to Lukashenka and his regime. 
The domestic policy and foreign policy of Belarus interact with and complement each 
other. Each sphere reinforces the other sphere, with the domestic sphere being more 
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important. Foreign policy in Belarus is only a certain way in order to strengthen the 
domestic sphere.71 
Alexander Lukashenka wrote “Belarus Tomorrow” the same year that both the 
Charter and the Treaty of the Union of Belarus and Russia was signed by Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin and Belarusian President Lukashenka. Lukashenka officially 
maintained a multi-vectored approach to foreign policy during the time when the Belarus-
Russia relationship was at its peak. Lukashenka and Yeltsin mutually worked together to 
strengthen ties between Belarus and Russia. This blatantly went against Lukashenka’s 
official foreign policy at the time in that he stated that he did not want to make any 
permanent ties with any foreign country or organization in order to keep Belarus’ foreign 
policy non-committable and to ensure that Belarus could work with multiple foreign 
actors instead of relying on one or two other actors.  
Officially Lukashenka is open to working with any country or political body in 
the world that wishes to work with Belarus. He stresses the importance of mutually 
beneficial relationships with all potential and existing partners. In practice, Lukashenka 
does not seek out mutually beneficially partnerships but instead seeks partnerships that 
will benefit Belarus and does not emphasize the importance of Belarus to the partners. 
Officially, Belarus is open to any partnership that would make Belarus an active 
participant in the global arena. In practice, Belarus has ideological differences than certain 
partners that would make certain partnerships unlikely. In many areas, Belarus is 
unwilling to compromise, especially when working with the European Union. In other 
areas, some economic partnerships that are not as beneficially to Belarus as others might 
be take precedent because of ideological similarities. For example, a more pragmatic 
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choice for Belarus would be to work with Europe and increase economic ties with the EU 
since Europe is right next to Belarus and a close neighbor. Instead, Lukashenka has 
increasing ties with Latin America because Belarus and Latin America have ideological 
similarities that make their partnership harmonious. The socialist governments and “anti-
Americanism” in Latin America make Latin America a feasible partner. Based on these 
ideological similarities, Belarus then implemented economic connections. The 
ideological differences between Belarus and the EU make mutually beneficial 
cooperation economically difficult. This is present today between Belarus and Russia as 
well since Russia changed its approach to foreign policy.72  
The modern Belarusian state cannot be understood without Lukashenka. 
Lukashenka became president in 1994; only 3 years after Belarus became an independent 
state. The Belarusian state and Lukashenka can be understood as indistinguishable. The 
policies implemented by the Belarusian government correspond to the goals of 
Lukashenka for his regime and for how he understands the Belarusian population. 
Lukashenka has created a regime and Belarusian identity based off of what he believes 
the Belarusian people want and what many Belarusians themselves do want. Lukashenka 
feels his regime reflects the Belarusian mentality and many Belarusians feel the same 
way. Every policy implemented by Lukashenka reflects the identity and ideology of the 
Belarusian people, an identity and ideology manifested by Lukashenka.  
Being resistant to change is a characteristic of the Belarusian people. The 
government is reluctant to make any new connections with partners or anything concrete 
because many elites state that this is typical for Belarusians to not want to make any 
permanent decisions that they cannot back out of later, in case it is the wrong decision. 
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These elites claim that Belarusian people are cautious and resistant to change; two traits 
that make sticking with the status quo seem like the best possible option for Belarusians. 
It is possible that many Belarusians do want change and would prefer different foreign 
and domestic policies but it is easier and more comfortable to keep things the way they 
are, especially when the current situation is satisfactory. Outsiders looking into Belarus 
think it is impossible for people to enjoy living in the way they are. This may be true for 
Belarusians, that they would prefer a different regime or a different leader; however, 
things in Belarus are not bad enough to warrant a drastic change in the regime in Belarus 
and for the past 20 years, nothing has changed in the country.  This is not only typical for 
Belarusians but typical for humans as a whole that if given the opportunity between 
sticking with something that is sufficiently good and pursuing change with unknown 
consequences, people often prefer to remain with the less risky situation. Many 
Belarusians might want a different regime, but the risk of things becoming worse than the 
current situation deters most Belarusians from an active pursuit of change.73  
6.2. Belarus Today 
Global watchdog organizations like FreedomHouse continue to criticize 
Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus. FreedomHouse deems Belarus as not free and views all 
of Lukashenka’s actions as solely motivated by Lukashenka’s own personal goals and 
whims. The rating for Belarus is 6.5 out of 7, with 7 being the worst rating and meaning 
absolutely not free.74 The consensus of western countries and organizations is that Belarus 
is not a democratic country and its elections continue to fail to meet democratic standards. 
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Belarus, however, does not claim to be a democracy, so the accusation of not being 
democratic is not offensive to Lukashenka or his regime. Lukashenka, and likely all the 
Belarusian people, appreciate the regime in place the way it is. There are a few political 
dissidents who do not agree with the current regime, but they are few. The general 
assumption of the west is that most Belarusians are unhappy with the regime in place and 
wish to have a fully realized democracy but are unable to demand this out of fear of their 
government. It is impossible to know the reality of the situation and whether or not the 
people are content with the status quo or are all just pretending to be for the sake of not 
being arrested. Lukashenka continues to ask the west why they care so much about what 
is going on in Belarus when he strongly believes that it is none of their business. The EU 
and the United States claim that the interests of the Belarusian people as their main 
concern, suggesting that the Belarusian people are held hostage by Lukashenka’s regime 
and ideology. 
This paper functions under the assumption that the majority of the Belarusian 
people appreciates Lukashenka and his regime and do not want to have a democracy that 
adheres to western standards. This research assumes that the government and ideology of 
Lukashenka reflect the ideology of the Belarusian people. Belarus did not follow the 
typical mode of nation building as other nations and currently lacks some of the critical 
components to national identity such as religious identity and wide-spread use of the 
national language. Nevertheless, Belarusian national identity contains certain 
characteristics that define the country and two of these characteristics are post-Soviet 
nostalgia and anti-elitism. These two characteristics contribute to how the Belarusian 
people see themselves as a nation and in turn, how Lukashenka uses these characteristics 
as a basis for his policies. Recently, Lukashenka stated that he has been pursuing a multi-
vectored approach to foreign policy for the past few years and this paper outlines how 
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this multi-vectored approach aligns with the Belarusian sense of national identity and how 
in the short term it seems counter to the ideologies of the Belarusian people but ultimately 
is in line with how Belarus sees itself as a nation.75  
There does not exist a Belarusian civil society and there is not a demand for one 
either. Belarusians adhere more to Soviet expectations of the government, consequently 
resulting in “the deterioration of individual responsibly, reluctance to independently make 
decisions, and no need for free choice”.  One opinion is that the goal of the Belarusian 
government is to keep the Belarusian people uneducated and unable to think for 
themselves. This leaves no desire for non-governmental organizations, which are isolated 
from the state.76  
6.3. Lukashenka Most Recent Discussion on Foreign Policy 
Recently in mid-April 2016, Lukashenka held a session to discuss relations 
between Belarus and the European Union. This session broadly outlined the goals of 
Belarus in its relation to the European Union. The session was enlightening and 
Lukashenka explained the situation of Belarus in its relations between the West and 
Russia. He stated that it was the destiny of Belarus to always be situated between the two 
great powers of Russia and the European Union. Lukashenka explicitly states that Russia 
is the brother of Belarus and that Belarusian economic and political relations with Russia 
must remain consistent with this. Lukashenka stated, “Russians are our brothers whether 
some like it or not. Our relations with them should be consistent with the fact”. 
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Lukashenka later discussed the potential benefits that Belarus will gain with the European 
Union and their recent openness to cooperate with Belarus. Belarus can help stop drug 
and human trafficking flow from the east to the west but also seeks to increase trade and 
other economic opportunity within Belarus. The current plan for Lukashenka is to solidify 
whatever potential benefits that Belarus can extract from the European Union and further 
negotiations. Lukashenka firmly believes that the potential benefits of working with the 
European Union are greater than the benefits of sticking to political bias. Lukashenka 
claims he will not work within the parameters of having to abide by ultimatums imposed 
by the West onto Belarus, has been pursuing a multi-vector approach to foreign policy 
already for years, and sees the vast economic potential in Russia, Central Asia, and now 
China.77 
When discussing cooperation with outside organizations, namely the EU or the 
WTO, Lukashenka emphasizes the pursuit of Belarusian national interests above all. 
Trade and export are key components to the Belarusian economy, making it impossible 
for the country to thrive without becoming an active member of the world economy; 
however, Lukashenka clearly states that the main prerogative of the country lies in 
establishing or increasing these relations is the national interests of the country.  
Lukashenka held a session to discuss cooperation with the World Trade 
Organization. The general tone of the entire session was skepticism. Lukashenka outlined 
the fact that the WTO up until recently had no interest in Belarus becoming a member. 
Lukashenka stated the potential benefits of not being in the WTO, namely freedom from 
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being bound to certain regulations and the prevention of the WTO to “impose certain 
obligations on [Belarus]”. Lukashenka also deemed it necessary to honor the other 
agreements between Belarus and its other trade partners, such as Russian and Belarus but 
ultimately decided Belarus will intensify its talks and negotiations with the WTO.78 
It remains to be seen whether or not Belarus becomes a member of the WTO. The 
common theme of Belarusian foreign policy has been non-committal. Belarus often 
makes plans or has negotiations without even deciding something concrete. This leaves 
Belarus with the freedom it desires to not be bound to any obligations or have to adhere 
to certain regulations. Belarus enjoys the isolation and does not seem eager to change its 
current state of affairs. Lukashenka’s emphasis on supporting the national interests in 
Belarus over anything else suggests that Lukashenka is not motivated to work with other 
people as much as he is motivated to secure the interests of the Belarusian people and 
protect them like the father he is to the people.  The goal of Lukashenka is to protect 
nation interests and therefore do what is in the interests of the Belarusian people. His 
instinct is to pursue isolation and not commit to alliances with outsiders in any concrete 
way as certain obligations might later ensue that would go against the national interests 
of the Belarusian people.  The issue that then arises is the fact that Belarus cannot maintain 
its independence without some degree of dependence on outsiders. Belarus relies heavily 
on export for economic security and its partnerships with its big trading partners 
contribute to the Belarusian economy.  Lukashenka stated himself that Belarus would 
always be caught in between Russia to the east and the EU to the west. The geographical 
position of Belarus does not allow for the country to isolate itself and remain free from 
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external pressure or influence. The EU wants to expand eastwards and have a buffer 
against Russia and disguise this desire by focusing heavily on the political situation in 
Belarus. As soon as the EU sensed some potential of Belarus to work with the EU and 
look westwards as Ukraine has done recently, the EU backed off on these political 
impositions and lifted sanctions on Belarus. Lukashenka played into what the EU wanted 
by releasing some political prisoners and appearing to cooperate more with the EU in 
hopes to gain some financial support from the EU. But the desire to work with the EU 
stops here at attracting investment and other means of flow of money from the EU to 
Belarus. Lukashenka still views Russia as its brother and partner and recently stated he 
will respect this bond. He also hopes to continue and expand ties with Central Asian 
countries and with China.  Within Belarus’ multi-vectored policy, the EU is a possible 
vector but only to a certain extent. Belarus sees the EU as a vector only to the extent of 
attracting investment in Belarus from EU member states and Belarus gaining another 
potential market for its exports. Belarus only wants a relationship with the EU if there 
will be clear benefits to the Belarusian people and does not want to be subject to the EU 
meddling in the affairs of Belarus, which poses a potential threat as the EU has strict 
criteria for how Belarus ought to behave politically, although when there is an opportunity 
for the EU to use Belarus as a way to undermine Russia, then these political impositions 
do not matter as much. 
6.4. Analysis of Dependence in Foreign Policy  
The difference between the potential and actual dependence of Belarus on the 
European Union and on Russia is that the dependence of Belarus of the European Union 
would most likely not be a threat to the sovereignty of Belarus. The European Union 
supports nation-states and encourages democracy, which states often achieve through 
nationalism. There is no fear for the Belarusian state’s existence by means of dependence 
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on the European Union. Dependence on Russia, on the other hand, may potentially leave 
Belarus’ sovereignty vulnerable, especially through the pursuit of the Union State (which 
neither state is currently actively pursuing).   The dependency on Russia for Belarus acted 
as a way for Belarus to secure its independence. Less dependency on Russia leaves the 
independence of Belarus vulnerable, as Belarus needs to make sure that it can secure itself 
on its own without preferential support from Russia or without the economic and political 
benefits from maintaining a connection with Russia.   
The sovereignty of Belarus is not under threat by aligning with the European 
Union; however, its independence is. If Belarus aligns with the EU, Belarus would have 
to follow very specific stipulations. Lukashenka would certainly have to give up his 
presidency and the economy would have to undergo serious reforms. The regime that 
Lukashenka manifested over the past two decades would have to drastically change and 
all but disappear. This is not something that Lukashenka or the Belarusian people want. 
Hence, the adoption recently of more vectors to the Belarusian foreign policy, in hopes 
to solve this predicament of being caught between Russia and Europe, a position Belarus 
has found itself in for centuries, although usually siding with Russia to the east and not 
working with the west. Lukashenka feels the presence of dependence and using his role 
as the father of the Belarusian people, he aspires to protect the Belarusian people and their 
independence. He attempts this by a method that would prevent the Belarusian people 
from having to sacrifice either their sovereignty or their desire to make their own 
decisions for themselves, decisions based on what the Belarusian people want from their 
government or how Lukashenka wants to govern the Belarusian people.  
6.4.1. Application of Interdependence Theory to Belarus 
Belarus pursues interdependency as a means to break out of its dependency on its 
huge neighbors to the west and to the east. Historically, politically, and economically, 
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Belarus has enormous ties to Russia, which places Belarus in a vulnerable position of 
dependency on Russia. Belarus also has large ties with the European Union and after 
Russia it is the second greatest region for export for Belarus. In line with dependency 
theory, Belarus values its independence and views it as protection from external 
dominion.  Belarus currently seeks interdependent connections with non-traditional 
sources. Latin America and China are two of these sources and since the mid-2000s these 
ties have been increasing yearly.  
Belarus does not view itself as a dependent nation and official seeks mutual 
relationships with all its foreign partners, which is particularly emphasized when 
describing its policy towards Russia, CIS, the European Union, and the United States. 
Belarus claims to be entirely open to respectful and mutually beneficially partnerships 
and that any issues with these aforementioned entities has stemmed from the others 
unwillingness to view Belarus as an equal and respect its own domestic policies.  
The real situation in Belarus is in line with the “core/periphery” aspect of 
dependency theory, is that many countries, particularly those in the west, categorize 
Belarus as a “third-world country”, with a repressive regime. The view that Belarus is 
underdeveloped and has a regime that is not as advanced as the “first world countries” 
suggests that Belarus’ desire for a mutually beneficial interdependent relationship with 
these countries will prove to be impossible until they acknowledge that Belarus is not 
backwards or somehow lagging behind the West, or other countries that deem themselves 
as more developed and entitled to cast judgment on the Belarusian government.79 
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What is the difference between dependence and interdependency and how are they 
related in the context of Belarus? Belarus’ official policy maintains that it wishes to secure 
its independence. At one point in time, Belarusian dependency on Russia secured its 
independence by granting Belarus the means necessary to maintain its sovereignty by way 
of economic support. Belarus feared that Russia’s change in its foreign policy beginning 
in the early 2000s threatened Belarusian independence as Belarus no longer enjoyed as 
preferential treatment as it had in the past (though still very preferential). Belarus does 
not want to be solely dependent on any foreign country out of fear of vulnerability to the 
independence of the Belarusian nation. Belarus still maintains strong ties and relations 
with Russia but seeks other avenues within the international community that are mutually 
beneficial to each participant (interdependency). I maintain that Belarus is adopting an 
interdependent approach in order to break away from dependency. Belarus does not want 
to be dependent, not only on Russia, but also not on any other country or polity. Working 
with Latin American countries allows Belarus the mutual relationship it seeks since Latin 
America and Belarus have similar economic and political policies. Belarus fears 
dependence. Lukashenka does not want Belarus to depend on outside partners. The 
solution to this problem is interdependence and a multi-vectored foreign policy. Belarus 
depends on Russia for energy sources. Belarus does not depend on the European Union 
for energy or for trade. The Belarusian economy is tied to CIS and to Russia within CIS. 
Belarus does not mind this dependence as long as it does not pose a threat to Belarusian 
security. Dependence in itself has the potential to create some type of threat to the 
dependent and gives the donor country more power. Most countries today are not 
exclusively dependent. For example, Belarus may be dependent on Russia for energy 
resources like gas and oil; however, Russia depends on Belarus as a political partner and 
a buffer country between Russia and the EU. Each country in this circumstance depends 
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on the other to some extent. The degree of dependence varies between each participant. 
Interdependence exists to some magnitude in the majority of relations in the international 
community, especially in an ever inter-connected and globalized world.  
In the case of Belarus, there seemed to be only one vector in their foreign policy 
from the 1990s to the early 2000s- Russia. Belarus switched its policies after it began to 
fear that having a uni-vector approach to its foreign policy would prove to be a threat to 
Belarusian independence and sovereignty.  This fear stems from the change in Russian 
foreign policy to a more pragmatic approach and Belarus then feeling the need to 
reevaluate its approach to foreign policy. Another possible reason for this multi-vector 
approach in Belarus is not that it wishes to break ties with Russia, but that Lukashenka 
sees opportunities with the EU and China to attract investment and money into the 
Belarusian economy, while maintaining its special relationship with Russia. Belarus is so 
intrinsically connected with Russia that it would take drastic measures and new 
relationships in order to break out of this relationship. That is why Belarus is working not 
only with China and the EU, but also with the non-world power of Latin America. Latin 
American countries and Belarus are connected in the fact that they both experience 
dependence and external pressure from giant powers. By working with each other they 
gain the potential of another source of bargaining power. 
7. Conclusion 
 At first glance, Belarusian foreign policy seems to be changing and opening up to 
becoming less dependent on Russia and more open to new partnerships. Officially, this 
foreign policy has not changed and Lukashenka has always adopted a multi-vectored 
approach to Belarusian foreign policy. In 1997, President Lukashenka was already 
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discussing his plans for a more incorporated Belarus into the international arena in his 
book Belarus Tomorrow.  
 I highlight the complicated intricacies behind Lukashenka and his policies, 
namely his foreign policy. Initially, it appears that Lukashenka changes his standpoints 
depending on the international climate and decides spontaneously how the Belarusian 
government will deal with the international community in its foreign relations. I used 
qualitative analysis of the opinions of Belarusian elites, Lukashenka himself, the official 
policies of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as secondary material 
written by Belarusian scholars and specialists.  
 The findings of my qualitative research reflect that Belarusian foreign policy is in 
fact consistent. Belarusian foreign policy at first glance appears that it has changed from 
uni-vectored to multi-vectored, from a close relationship with Russia to a relationship 
more and more open to the west and other international partners. In fact, the situation is 
not so simple and does not follow a linear path of becoming less dependent on Russia and 
more interdependent with other partners. Instead, Belarus consistently has been multi-
vectored officially under Lukashenka’s regime since the 1990s. Belarus’ movement 
between different vectors is typical for Belarus. Despite the multi-vectored official 
foreign policy in Belarus, President Lukashenka maintains that Russia is still the main 
partner with Belarus, no matter what new connections are being forged between Belarus 
and other international actors. Lukashenka maintains a multi-vectored approach to foreign 
policy and shows no signs of altering this policy. The official policy and the reality of the 
foreign policy in Belarus does not exactly line up as in lieu of the claim that Belarus seeks 
open and mutual beneficial relationships with all its partners, Lukashenka still resists 
making any concrete partnerships and relies mostly on Russia. A multi-vectored approach 
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to foreign policy is in line with Lukashenka’s desire to decrease dependence on Russia 
and corresponds to Lukashenka’s idea of what the Belarusian people want based on his 
understanding of the Belarusian identity. The identity question in Belarus is strongly 
related to the role of dependence and interdependence in foreign policy. Not only do 
Belarusians seek to understand themselves but also have a way in which they want the 
world to see and understand them. The multi-vectored approach to Belarusian foreign 
policy is not in its essence about reality, but mostly about imagine and how Belarus wants 
to project itself to others and how it wants to be seen by others. The main goal is mutual 
benefits and respect, and this is clearly something that Belarus feels it is lacking. In 
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